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SLAVES AS PLAINTIFFS
Alfred L. Brophy*
Redemption Songs: Suing for Freedom Before Dred Scott. By
Lea VanderVelde. New York: Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xii,
210. $31.95.
Introduction
Lea VanderVelde’s Redemption Songs: Suing for Freedom Before Dred
Scott1 tells the story of about 300 suits filed in St. Louis—in the forty years
before the Civil War—by people held as slaves who were claiming they were
free. The book poses bold challenges to several broad themes in American
legal history. First, VanderVelde concentrates on enslaved peoples’ argu-
ments about their freedom, reframing our understanding of those who
count as interpreters and remakers of the law. This approach gives signifi-
cant credit to enslaved people for promoting freedom and turns attention
away from the judges, slave owners, and politicians who are so frequently
the focus of legal history.2 Related to this, VanderVelde suggests that the
enslaved could draw powerful slave owners into court and thus upend tradi-
tional power structures (pp. 1–8). This resurrects a world of African Ameri-
can history where those frequently treated as objects of law and regulation
become wielders of power.
Redemption Songs is one of the finest of several recent studies that are
causing us to rather dramatically rethink the legal history of free people of
African descent in the South during the years of slavery.3 It is part of a
wholesale rethinking of Southern and African American history. Redemption
Songs has implications for legal historians’ assessment of the ways that the
law of race operated in the South, and just how much statutes, dictates of
judges and local law enforcement, community norms, and interpersonal
* Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill. I would like to thank Emma Ellman-Golan, Alexandra Fedorak, John He, Claire
Lally, James Mestichelli, Michael Schoeppner, and Julie Siegel for comments, and Emily Jessup
for research assistance.
1. Lea VanderVelde is the Josephine R. Witte Professor of Law, University of Iowa Col-
lege of Law.
2. See, e.g., Ariela J. Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the An-
tebellum Southern Courtroom (2000); R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Jo-
seph Story (1985); G. Edward White, 3–4 History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–1835 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Aslakson, Making Race in the Courtroom: The Legal
Construction of Three Races in Early New Orleans (2014); Kirt von Daacke, Free-
dom Has a Face: Race, Identity, and Community in Jefferson’s Virginia (2012).
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dealings worked for those in the twilight zone between slavery and freedom.
Therein lies a story.
Much literature on African American slavery emphasizes the brutality of
slavery.4 Recently, that literature has also emphasized how economic inter-
ests shaped the law of slavery to promote the interests of the slave-owning
classes.5 A parallel literature on proslavery ideology, especially in the judici-
ary,6 details slave owners’ and Southern legal leaders’ harsh ideas. That liter-
ature links the brutality of slavery to the legal system.7 Yet other works
emphasize very different pieces of the African American experience with
slavery. For instance, Annette Gordon-Reed’s The Hemingses of Monticello
focuses on the lives and ideas of enslaved people independent of slavery,
while also acknowledging the brutality and inhumanity of slavery as an im-
portant subtheme.8
A number of studies, including Redemption Songs, focus on the legal
system as it relates to African Americans in the Old South. They suggest—
rather counterintuitively, given Justice Taney’s statement in Dred Scott9—
that African Americans did have some rights that white men (and courts)
were obligated to respect. One of the first works to begin this bold reinter-
pretation was Melvin Ely’s Israel on the Appomattox, a study of a community
of free people in Prince Edward County, Virginia, in the pre–Civil War era.10
Ely based his study of the hundreds of free people largely on land records,
wills, and the occasional civil suit or criminal prosecution. The community
prospered even as slavery persisted all around.11 Other more recent work has
developed the theme of the economic, social, and property options of free
people in Virginia—and their ability to maintain a life despite Virginia laws
that required both registration of free people and removal of recently freed
4. E.g., Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market
(1999).
5. See, e.g., Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the
Making of American Capitalism (2014); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A New His-
tory of Global Capitalism (2014).
6. See, e.g., Christopher Tomlins, Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Iden-
tity in Colonizing English America, 1580–1865, at 13–15 (2010); Alfred L. Brophy, The
Nat Turner Trials, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1817 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy and Monuments, 87
N.C. L. Rev. 799 (2009) (discussing Justice Thomas Ruffin’s proslavery jurisprudence); An-
drew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619–1865: A Case Study of
Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 Am. J. Legal Hist. 93 (1985) (discussing the
release of owners from liability for abuse of enslaved people).
8. Annette Gordon-Reed, The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family
(2008).
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
10. Melvin Patrick Ely, Israel on the Appomattox: A Southern Experiment in
Black Freedom from the 1790s Through the Civil War (2004).
11. See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 6, at 1829 n.93, 1830–35 (discussing slavery in South-
ampton County, which was near Prince Edward County).
April 2017] Slaves as Plaintiffs 897
people.12 In 2012, Kirt von Daacke expanded Ely’s analysis of the role of free
people of color in pre–Civil War Virginia to Albemarle County: the home of
the University of Virginia.13 His revealingly titled book, Freedom Has a Face,
turned to legal records to detail the involvement of free people of color in
the county’s economic and social life.14
Although Gordon-Reed, Ely, and von Daacke relied heavily on legal
records, the operation of the law was not central to their books.15 Others
have turned more explicitly to the operation of the legal system to depict
greater rights for free people—and those claiming to be free—than we
might expect. For the states in the “Deep” North, like Massachusetts, the use
of courts to secure freedom is perhaps unsurprising.16 Emily Blanck is one of
the most recent of a series of scholars who depict how Massachusetts judges
ended slavery in the state beginning around 1780.17 Important to Blanck’s
story, as well as to VanderVelde’s, is that the enslaved people combined ac-
tion—such as running away and disappearing into the African American
community—with court challenges to gain freedom.18 The story that
emerges is one where humble enslaved people—those with so seemingly lit-
tle power—use multiple strategies to make their freedom a reality. Some-
times the strategies involved appeals to law; and when they did, those
appeals were sometimes successful, in part, because the enslaved people ad-
vanced a theory that appealed to the court. Massachusetts was primed in
1780 to find that the principles of liberty behind the Revolution encom-
passed the state’s enslaved people as well.19
The more surprising story comes from southern and western states.
Martha Jones has a series of articles detailing the participation of enslaved
and free African Americans in the legal system, often as plaintiffs.20 Running
12. See, e.g., Michael L. Nicholls, Creating Identity: Free Blacks and the Law, 35 Slavery &
Abolition 214 (2014).
13. von Daacke, supra note 3.
14. See id. at 211–43.
15. See Ely, supra note 10; Gordon-Reed, supra note 8; von Daacke, supra note 3.
16. See, e.g., C.S. Manegold, Ten Hills Farm: The Forgotten History of Slavery in
the North 234–35 (2010) (describing two instances in the 1780s where slaves in Massachu-
setts used the state’s constitution to successfully sue for their emancipation).
17. Emily Blanck, Tyrannicide: Forging an American Law of Slavery in Revolu-
tionary South Carolina and Massachusetts 116–31 (2014).
18. See, e.g., pp. 195–96 (discussing the fact that women were more likely to sue for their
freedom than men, who were alternatively more inclined to physically flee their owners ille-
gally); Blanck, supra note 17, at 116–27 (discussing freedom suits in post-Revolutionary
Massachusetts).
19. See Blanck, supra note 17, at 123–27 (discussing Quock Walker suits and emancipa-
tion in Massachusetts in wake of Revolution); Alfred L. Brophy, Introduction to Law, in The
Encyclopedia of New England 889, 893–94 (Burt Feintuch & David H. Watters eds., 2005)
(same).
20. See, e.g., Martha S. Jones, Leave of Court: African American Claims-Making in the Era
of Dred Scott v. Sandford, in Contested Democracy: Freedom, Race, and Power in Amer-
ican History 54 (Manisha Sinha & Penny Von Eschen eds., 2007); Martha S. Jones, The Case
of Jean Baptiste, un Cre´ole de Saint-Domingue: Narrating Slavery, Freedom, and the Haitian
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parallel to that work, Jones has also discussed how African American women
wielded sophisticated ideas about law and legal thought.21
A series of scholars who, like VanderVelde, have focused on St. Louis
freedom suits, have found greater flexibility in slavery in the Old South than
we are accustomed to hearing about.22 Their scholarship focuses on the
blurred lines between slavery and freedom along the Mississippi River and
the ways that slaves challenged their bondage, often by escaping along the
River, but sometimes by filing lawsuits.23 To be sure, there has been some
literature on freedom suits in other parts of the country. Judith Schafer24
and, more recently, Kenneth Aslakson25 have uncovered freedom suits in
New Orleans. Recently, Judson Crump and I have recovered the story of a
child kidnapped in Philadelphia and sold into slavery in Alabama, who was
then freed in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1827.26 Together, these stories suggest
there were legal processes allowing free people—and those claiming to be
free—some access to courts in the Old South. Yet, in the 1840s and 1850s,
legislatures and courts were tightening the opportunities for freedom suits.27
A parallel literature examines the role of outsider intellectuals as they
challenged slave law.28 Those studies look to formerly enslaved people like
Revolution in Baltimore City, in The American South and the Atlantic World 104 (Brian
Ward et al. eds., 2013); Martha S. Jones, Hughes v. Jackson: Race and Rights Beyond Dred
Scott, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1757 (2013).
21. See Martha S. Jones, All Bound Up Together: The Woman Question in Afri-
can American Public Culture, 1830–1900 (2007).
22. See, e.g., Kelly Marie Kennington, Law, Geography, and Mobility: Suing for Freedom in
Antebellum St. Louis, 80 J.S. Hist. 575 (2014) (focusing on the mobility made possible by the
Mississippi River as a key explanation of the number of freedom suits); David Thomas
Konig, The Long Road to Dred Scott: Personhood and the Rule of Law in the Trial Court Records
of St. Louis Slave Freedom Suits, 75 UMKC L. Rev. 53, 58–73 (2006). Legal historians have also
carried this story of African American agency into the post-Civil War era. See, e.g., Melissa
Milewski, From Slave to Litigant: African Americans in Court in the Postwar South, 1865–1920,
30 Law & Hist. Rev. 723 (2012).
23. E.g., Anne Twitty, Before Dred Scott: Slavery and Legal Cultures in the American
Confluence, 1787–1857 (2016).
24. Judith Kelleher Schafer, Becoming Free, Remaining Free: Manumission and
Enslavement in New Orleans, 1846–1862 (2003).
25. Aslakson, supra note 3, at 165–80.
26. Judson Crump & Alfred L. Brophy, Twenty-One Months a Slave: Cornelius Sinclair’s
Odyssey, 86 Miss. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (describing the lawsuit filed by local ministers on
behalf of Sinclair, which resulted in his return to freedom and, ultimately, to Philadelphia,
where he participated in the prosecution of one of his kidnappers).
27. See Kennington, supra note 22, at 584 (suggesting that a change in Missouri law in
1840s discouraged lawsuits challenging slavery); Michael Schoeppner, Peculiar Quarantines:
The Seamen Acts and Regulatory Authority in the Antebellum South, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 559,
562 (2013) (detailing the limited rights of free people of color in Southern port cities, and how
the laws “ ‘happened’ in the antebellum South”). An 1845 Missouri statute permitted slaves to
challenge their owners in court, but allowed the court to impose security for “all costs that
may be adjudged against” the petitioner. See Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 69, § 2 (1845); cf. id. § 12
(presuming that an African American person was a slave).
28. See generally Caleb Smith, The Oracle and the Curse: A Poetics of Justice
from the Revolution to the Civil War (2013).
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Frederick Douglass,29 antislavery women like Harriet Beecher Stowe,30 phi-
losophers like Henry David Thoreau,31 and antislavery lawyers like William
Goodell.32 That is, as scholars have explored the social and legal history of
slaves’ challenges to slavery, they have also developed a sophisticated litera-
ture that explores how outsider intellectuals—black and white, female and
male—challenged the American law of slavery. There is, of course, a contin-
uous strain of legal–historical writing that focuses on the limitations of the
legal system in the Old South.
I. Interpreting Slaves as Plaintiffs in St. Louis
This is where Lea VanderVelde’s work on lawsuits filed by people held in
slavery in St. Louis, Missouri, enters the debate. More than a decade ago,
VanderVelde uncovered these suits with the help of archivists in Missouri.33
A handful of these cases were known because the Missouri Supreme Court
had heard them and decided many in favor of freedom.34 Historians had also
known about some of the lower court cases for decades.35 In one improbable
interpretation, Allen Johnson of Yale University’s Department of History
concluded in 1921 that border states like Missouri treated petitioners fairly.36
Now we know that there were many times more suits than even he was
aware of. Many of those suits were successful,37 others were unsuccessful,
and some had unrecorded results.
29. See, e.g., Jeannine Marie DeLombard, Slavery on Trial: Law, Abolitionism,
and Print Culture (2007).
30. See, e.g., Sarah N. Roth, Gender and Race in Antebellum Popular Culture
(2014).
31. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 28, at 2–6; Albert J. Von Frank, The Trials of
Anthony Burns: Freedom and Slavery in Emerson’s Boston 281–85 (1998).
32. E.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Antislavery Women and the Origins of American Jurisprudence,
94 Tex. L. Rev. 115, 120 (2015) (reviewing Roth, supra note 30).
33. See pp. ix–xii. See Freedom Suits Case Files, 1814–1860, St. Louis Circuit Court
Historical Records Project, http://www.stlcourtrecords.wustl.edu/about-freedom-suits-se-
ries.php [http://perma.cc/E9JE-VL47], for an online version of these petitions.
34. See, e.g., Wilson v. Melvin, 4 Mo. 592 (1837); Rachael v. Walker, 4 Mo. 350 (1836);
Meechum v. Judy, 4 Mo. 361 (1836); Marguerite v. Chouteau, 3 Mo. 540 (1834); Hay v.
Dunky, 3 Mo. 588 (1834); Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270 (1833); Ralph v. Duncan, 3 Mo. 194
(1833); Tramell v. Adam, 2 Mo. 155 (1829); La Grange v. Chouteau, 2 Mo. 20 (1828); Milly v.
Smith, 2 Mo. 36 (1828); Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824). A change in judicial attitude
was brewing as early as the 1830s, but it was most pronounced in 1852 when the Missouri
Supreme Court decided against Dred Scott’s freedom suit in Scott v. Emerson. 15 Mo. 576
(1852). See also Davis v. Evans, 18 Mo. 249 (1853); Sylvia v. Kirby, 17 Mo. 434 (1853); Calvert
v. Steamboat Timoleon, 15 Mo. 595 (1852).
35. See Harrison Anthony Trexler, Slavery in Missouri, 1804–1865, at 212–18
(1914) (discussing trial court opinions in St. Louis’s court archives).
36. Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 Yale L.J. 161, 181
(1921) (“From a cursory examination of the session laws of the border slave States . . . the
writer is persuaded that substantial justice was on the whole accorded to the negro claiming
his freedom.”).
37. See supra note 34.
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It is VanderVelde who had the wisdom to use these cases to reveal calls
for freedom. Redemption Songs develops the metaphor of enslaved people
“singing” songs of redemption by filing lawsuits to claim their freedom in
Missouri courts.38 Missouri law allowed people held in slavery to file suit
challenging their owners’ rights to hold them.39 Early on, Missouri law pro-
vided for the appointment of a lawyer for indigent slaves, and even allowed
them to remain free during the pending litigation.40 Later, the legislature
tightened the laws so that a court could require the slaves themselves to post
a bond in case they lost their suit.41
The next twelve chapters of Redemption Songs focus on specific cases
where slaves sued in Missouri, mostly successfully, for their freedom.42 Van-
derVelde tells the story of some of the better-known (though by no means
well-known) cases, such as Winny, a slave born in the Carolinas, who was
later held for a few years in slavery in the free territory of Illinois.43 With a
petition filed around 1818, Winny successfully called her “owner” and the
owners of her children to account.44 Her claim was that she was held in
territory that the Northwest Ordinance made free—and she and her chil-
dren were thus free (p. 61). This set the precedent for those with similar
claims for several decades. Other plaintiffs, such as Lydia Titus, successfully
used the courts to assert freedom based on her service in a free territory
before arriving in Missouri (pp. 67–69). Titus, who won her freedom in
Illinois territory around 1807, successfully sued in Missouri to reclaim her
children, who had been captured on charges of being runaways in the early
1830s (pp. 70–75). And VanderVelde tells the story of a Canadienne Rose,
whose children challenged being held in bondage by one of the St. Louis’s
most affluent families—one that faced frequent challenges from freedom
suits brought by their slaves (p. 177). The children based their claim on
Rose’s time in free territory back in the eighteenth century.45 The litigation
wound its way up and down the Missouri courts for fifteen years, and the
children were eventually freed in 1862, during the Civil War (pp. 192–93).
38. Chapter 1 (developing “[a] [m]etaphor for the [v]oices of the [s]ubordinate [b]uried
in [h]istory”).
39. Mo. Rev. Stat. 285, § 1 (1835).
40. See id. § 2 (permitting suit without mentioning bond).
41. While the 1845 Act continued to allow slaves to sue “as a poor person,” Mo. Rev.
Stat. ch. 69, § 1 (1845), the 1845 Act tightened the law, which had earlier permitted slaves to
sue without bond, id. § 16.
42. Ten of those twelve chapters deal with the redemption song of one family each (chap-
ters 2–9, 11, 13). Chapter Ten expands to two, unrelated claimants—both enslaved women—
whose cases were complicated by the fact that their partners (in one case a white man and in
the other case a black man) had sold them. In each case, they won their freedom suits. And
Chapter Twelve deals with a series of suits by slaves owned by one person, Milton Duty. Those
suits took place as part of the litigation of Duty’s estate, for his will had promised freedom to
the slaves, but creditors of the estate claimed they needed to be satisfied first.
43. See chapter 4.
44. See p. 61.
45. See p. 186.
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The final chapter puts this data together to explain what factors trig-
gered suits, discussing why some slaves chose to file suit while others ran
away (Chapter Fourteen). VanderVelde examines the meaning of the rule of
law in a time when juries decided so much about slaves’ fate (pp. 202–03).
She concludes with the unsuccessful litigation in Dred Scott, in which the
Missouri Supreme Court and then the U.S. Supreme Court worked to deny
the Scott family their freedom (pp. 205–10). VanderVelde puts the Dred
Scott case into context—she shows that the Scott family’s claim was one of
many claims made by people who believed they were free.46 In some cases,
those claims to freedom rested, like the Scott family’s claim, on having trav-
eled to a free state.47 In other cases, the plaintiffs complained that they had
been promised freedom, had received it via will but were kept in slavery, or
had been born to a free mother but wrongfully kept in slavery.
VanderVelde asks: What do these improbable cases mean? Part of the
story is that those cases tell us about how humble people used the court
system, how they obtained lawyers, and how on occasion they brought the
mighty to account (pp. 17–22). Redemption Songs presents a legal analog to
the past several generations of outstanding work on the social history of
slavery—work which looks at the world from the perspective of the en-
slaved.48 The cases reveal how the enslaved litigated, what they did when
their cases were pending, and how the rule of law could be turned to the
slave’s advantage. And the cases may hold the potential for wholesale
changes in how we practice legal history, as well as whose stories we tell and
how. VanderVelde views these suits from the perspective of the petitioners
who staked out legal claims and brought the powerful (their owners) to ac-
count in court. As VanderVelde demonstrates, the enslaved litigants devel-
oped theories within the legal tradition, argued about their rights, and took
action to free themselves. She reveals how people used legal technology to set
the enslaved free in a slave state, in the dark depths of slavery.
The results are surprising; I would even be tempted to say shocking.
One would not think that slaves would ever have an opportunity to bring
their putative owners into court. Solomon Northup’s narrative, Twelve Years
a Slave, testifies to the extraordinary difficulty of challenging slavery in the
midst of the plantation South.49 Part of the story may be that in Vander-
Velde’s account, the claims for freedom were filed in St. Louis, rather than
the Red River district of Louisiana. But even in the relative freedom of St.
Louis, it is impressive and astonishing that people held in slavery had the
resources and temerity to try to bring their “owners” to account. On this
46. See pp. 205–10.
47. Lea VanderVelde, Mrs. Dred Scott: A Life on Slavery’s Frontier 231–32
(2009).
48. See, e.g., Vincent Brown, The Reaper’s Garden: Death and Power in the
World of Atlantic Slavery (2008); Richard S. Dunn, A Tale of Two Plantations:
Slave Life and Labor in Jamaica and Virginia (2014); Leslie M. Harris, In the Shadow
of Slavery: African Americans in New York City, 1626–1863 (2003).
49. Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 2000) (1853).
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issue, Redemption Songs is an excellent contribution to a trend in recent
history that focuses on the rights of free people in the Old South. It is an
important story of how enslaved people saw the world and tried to mobilize.
VanderVelde’s focus is on enslaved people who have been ignored for far, far
too long and about whom she has substantial new insights. On those issues,
this is a transformative book that uses new data and asks new questions. It is
substantively and methodologically very important.
Through her focus on enslaved plaintiffs and their lawyers, VanderVelde
uncovers a story line that we have not heard before. She shows that slaves
had more rights than we previously knew and that slaves used these rights to
challenge slavery.50 VanderVelde’s narrative shows how humble people—on
rare occasions, to be sure—challenged the institution of slavery. For far too
long, this important story was not told. It is absent from works on pre–Civil
War legal history,51 even by those who write so eloquently about slave law.52
Partly because of the surprising nature of VanderVelde’s findings, one is
led to ask: Just how representative are these suits? Her research invites ques-
tions about whether the central tendency was against challenges to slavery.
She catalogues 300 challenges by 239 people (p. 3). Of the ninety-one chal-
lenges that went to trial, about half were successful (p. 202). We do not
know the result of many others (p. 5). This suggests how difficult it was to
get any kind of hearing. One other way of conceptualizing this is that the
slave population of St. Louis peaked around 1850, with around 5,000 en-
slaved people.53 A small percentage of them used the legal system to chal-
lenge their servitude, although perhaps that is a high percentage of those
who had a valid claim to freedom.54
A small number of cases might still be very revealing of the legal system.
Thus, we must ask: What do these cases say about the nature of slavery and
law? (pp. 17–22). This important study broaches new questions about how
50. Pp. 17–22; see also Brophy, supra note 6, at 1858–59 (discussing the lawyers for the
Nat Turner rebels).
51. The best-known works in pre–Civil War legal thought of the 1960s and 1970s paid
scant attention to slavery. See, e.g., Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America: From
the Revolution to the Civil War (1965). Even those that emphasized the economic analy-
sis of law, and found a shift in the common law to promote economic growth, dealt little with
slavery. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860
(1977).
52. See, e.g., Andrew Fede, Roadblocks to Freedom: Slavery and Manumission in
the United States South (2011); Tomlins, supra note 6. Mark Graber even finds the law of
slavery in Dred Scott in the mainstream of pre–Civil War constitutional law, but does not
discuss legal challenges brought by ordinary people. See Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the
Problem of Constitutional Evil 91–92 (2006).
53. As St. Louis’s population expanded from 1830 to 1860, the percent of enslaved stead-
ily declined. The overall population of St. Louis was 14,125 in 1830, 35,979 in 1840, 104,978 in
1850, and 190,524 in 1860. St. Louis’s slave population in 1830 was 2,796 (19%), in 1840 was
4,616 (12%), in 1850 was 5,967 (5.6%), and in 1860 had declined to 4,340 (2.3%). Historical
Census Browser, Univ. of Va. Library, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/ [https://perma.cc/
6S4D-43YN].
54. See pp. 7–8 (outlining the four categories of “freedom suits”).
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“subordinate people took the lead in pressing their legal rights in suing to
establish their freedom in direct contravention of their masters’ wishes” (p.
11). It raises key questions about what inspires legal change.55 And it invites
questions about the extent to which enslaved people had some minimal ac-
cess to the rule of law. Some reviews of Redemption Songs have already iden-
tified its implications for how we think about the “rule of law” within the
system of slavery, which itself was so dependent on positive law to support
it.56
II. The Path of the [Proslavery] Law
Even though the slaves sung such eloquent and powerful “redemption
songs,” the law changed from an antislavery law in 1824 to the zealously
proslavery law of Scott v. Emerson of 1852 (and later Dred Scott v. Sandford
of 1857).57 Legal precedent, thus, was shaped by the powerful, who wrong-
fully ignored the pleas of the enslaved and those held in slavery.58
How do we assess the impetus to the change in the law of freedom and
slavery from 1824 to the Civil War? How do we account for the shift in the
1840s and 1850s, when the Missouri Supreme Court limited the rights of
people held in slavery to challenge their “owners”? What, to borrow Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s apt imagery, was the “[p]ath of the [proslavery] [l]aw”?59
In fact, some of the South’s pre–Civil War lawyers asked those kinds of
55. For a similar point, see Michael Schoeppner, Book Review, 37 Slavery & Abolition
230, 231 (2016) (reviewing Redemption Songs) (questioning “the ways that demographic and
economic shifts altered the political dynamics and legal culture in St. Louis”).
56. Annette Gordon-Reed, Book Review, 102 J. Am. Hist. 1190 (2016) (reviewing Re-
demption Songs); Martha S. Jones, Book Review, 33 Law & Hist. Rev. 1009 (2015) (reviewing
Redemption Songs); Loren Schweninger, Book Review, 5 J. Civ. War Era 596 (2015) (review-
ing Redemption Songs).
57. Compare infra text accompanying notes 63–72 (discussing the antislavery precedent
and thought that permeated various jurisdictions during the early nineteenth century), with
infra text accompanying notes 103–108 (discussing the proslavery sentiment that began to
dominate legal thought in the mid–nineteeth century).
58. See infra notes 109, 112. This finding is consistent with a broad set of work on South-
ern intellectual history and the coming of the Civil War, which focuses on the increasingly
proslavery ideas that permeated Southern politics, religion, and law. See, e.g., Alfred L.
Brophy, University, Court, and Slave: Pro-slavery Thought in Southern Colleges
and Courts and the Coming of Civil War (2016); 1 Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of
Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810–1860 (2004); Alfred L. Brophy,
The World Made by Laws and the Laws Made by the World of the Old South, in Signposts: New
Directions in Southern Legal History (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds.,
2013). There is a parallel literature that looks to the proslavery ideas and actions of Northern
and Southern schools. See, e.g., Craig Steven Wilder, Ebony & Ivy: Race, Slavery, and
the Troubled History of America’s Universities (2013).
59. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897). One might think
here about Holmes’s predecessors among Southern treatise writers. E.g., 1 Thomas R.R. Cobb,
An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of America (Philadel-
phia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858); George S. Sawyer, Southern Institutes (Philadel-
phia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1858); see also Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92
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questions: Why had earlier courts interpreted the law in an antislavery fash-
ion, even as Southern lawyers and judges increasingly advanced an alterna-
tive—and temporarily very successful argument—that the law was actually
proslavery? For instance, Thomas Cobb, the author of An Inquiry into the
Law of Negro Slavery—the most comprehensive proslavery legal treatise ever
written—argued that slavery was consistent with natural law, so that wher-
ever a slave went the law of slavery went with her, protecting her owner’s
property right in her.60 Cobb thought that many antislavery courts had al-
lowed their sentiments for slaves to trump their legal reasoning.61
Before we go to why there was a shift in Scott v. Emerson,62 there is a
backstory about why the Missouri courts voted for freedom in the first place.
Stretching back to the 1820s, Missouri had upheld claims brought by slaves
arguing for their emancipation. In its first case dealing with slave freedom,
Winny v. Whitesides,63 Justice Tompkins of the Missouri Supreme Court
cited nothing other than the Northwest Ordinance to show his preference
for freedom after slaves had traveled through free states.64
There were legal precedents in other jurisdictions that filled out the ide-
ology of freedom. For instance, in 1820, the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Lydia v. Rankin65 found that a slave who had been taken by her owner to
Indiana—then a free territory—was free, even though she had been brought
back to Kentucky, a slave state.66 Rankin disclaimed the general principles of
freedom.67 But it rested, like Winny four years later, on the principle that the
Northwest Ordinance prohibited slavery in the Indiana territory.68 Rankin
Tex. L. Rev. 383, 406 (2013) (reviewing Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Real-
ist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (2010)) (discussing the relationship between
Holmes and Cobb).
60. Cobb, supra note 59, ch. 1, §§ 1–16 (finding natural law protecting slavery based on
the near ubiquity of slavery in human history); see also James P. Holcombe, Is Slavery Consis-
tent with Natural Law?, An Address Delivered Before the Virginia State Agricultural Society, at
the Sixth Annual Exhibition, at Petersburg (Nov. 4, 1858), in 27 Southern Literary Messen-
ger 401 (1858).
61. See, e.g., Cobb, supra note 59, ch. 10, § 229 (praising the dissenting opinion in the
Connecticut Supreme Court case Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837), for protecting the
rights of a slave owner who journeyed to Connecticut).
62. 15 Mo. 576 (1852).
63. 1 Mo. 472 (1824).
64. Winny, 1 Mo. at 474–75. The Northwest Ordinance, passed first by the Congress
under the Articles of Confederation in 1787, was part of the territorial expansion of the United
States. Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 929–30 (1995). It governed land in the “Northwest” territory—what is
now Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Id. at 929 n.6. It was relevant to the
discussion of freedom because it prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory. See id. at 930.
Thus, the St. Louis plaintiffs frequently used it to argue that they had been in a free territory.
See Konig, supra note 22, at 68.
65. 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) (1820).
66. Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) at 467.
67. Id. at 470.
68. Id. at 470–71.
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supported a general right of owners to bring their slaves through free terri-
tory during temporary transit.69 It also stood, however, for the proposition
that residence in a free state or territory freed a slave—and that the slave had
a right to sue for her freedom.70 Moreover, her status as a free person re-
mained even upon return to a slave jurisdiction.71 Without positive law to
support it, there could be no slavery. This antislavery ideology was a key
tenet of thought until the 1830s.72 Winny separated law and morality, but
found in favor of morality.73 The rhetoric was not robustly against slavery,
but the effect was.74
For a while, the Missouri Supreme Court continued to follow Winny’s
general direction. The judges’ opinions in Missouri reflected the dominant
idea that slavery was inconsistent with natural law and should be limited.
There were some refinements (and restrictions) of Winny. One restriction
related to the nature of the time spent in a free territory. Missouri courts
began to ask whether the slave was held in slavery long enough in a free state
to justify a finding of freedom. This arose in 1828, in LaGrange v.
Chouteau.75 In 1816, Chouteau had taken, for employment, one member of
a family of slaves to Illinois (Illinois outlawed slavery), and on that basis the
family claimed freedom.76 The jury found—and Justice Wash affirmed—that
temporary residence in Illinois did not automatically free a slave.77 Where
Winny had implied that travel in a free jurisdiction effected freedom,78 Jus-
tice Wash suggested that freedom would only come if the slave had worked
in a free jurisdiction for an extended period.79 In this way, Justice Wash
pulled back from the principle of Winny that there needed to be a law to
support slavery.
69. Id. at 477–78.
70. Id. at 477–79.
71. Id. at 475–76.
72. See, e.g., Derek A. Webb, The Somerset Effect: Parsing Lord Mansfield’s Words on Slav-
ery in Nineteenth Century America, 32 Law & Hist. Rev. 455 (2014); William M. Wiecek,
Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 86, 118–28 (1974).
73. See Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472, 475–76 (1824).
74. See id.
75. 2 Mo. 20, 22 (1828), aff’d, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 287 (1830).
76. LaGrange, 2 Mo. at 20–21.
77. Id. at 22.
78. Winny, 1 Mo. at 475.
79. See LaGrange, 2 Mo. at 22. In a case fifteen years later, a slave lost a claim to freedom
based on time his mother had spent in the Northwest Territory. See Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo.
3 (1845). When she was there, the territory where she was held was still under British control
and, thus, the Northwest Ordinance could not have freed her. Id. at 9–10. Pierre and LaGrange
reveal that Missouri courts scrutinized the basis for freedom along several variables—includ-
ing whether the place the slave served was a free state or territory (as in Pierre) and whether
the nature of service in the free state or territory justified freedom (as in LaGrange).
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Yet, despite that setback, the basic doctrine—that a slave taken to a free
state for an extended period could become free—still seemed to hold.80 In
1833, in Julia v. McKinney,81 Justice McGirk, for a divided court, remanded a
claim by a slave who claimed she was free when she was hired out for a few
days in Illinois.82 The court found that the trial court verdict denying her
freedom was against law and evidence.83 This supported the idea that some
service in a free state, even brief, effected freedom. But a dissent by Justice
Wash—the author of the majority in LaGrange—indicated that conflicts
were brewing. His opinion suggested that the proslavery position that tem-
porary travel might not support a claim of freedom was growing in strength.
Justice Wash focused on the intent of the slave owner as the measure of
whether a slave had been freed by temporary service in the free state of
Illinois.84
Nevertheless, for more than a dozen years, the Missouri Supreme Court
followed the approach first articulated in Winny. In Rachael v. Walker,85 de-
cided by Justice McGirk in 1836, the Missouri court set the framework of
freedom in a case where a slave was taken by a U.S. military officer to a free
territory to serve him while he was stationed in that territory. At this point,
there was still a sense that the Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery in
the territories, and that even an Army officer taking slaves into the territories
for his own convenience would forfeit his rights to the slave.
A second exception to the general principle of Winny arose when courts
began to say that slave status reattached to slaves who voluntarily returned to
a slave state. Though first made famous in the English admiralty case The
Slave, Grace,86 this doctrine had adherents in the United States, in part be-
cause of the popularity of the 1827 English decision. That case was about a
slave, Grace, who was brought to England from the West Indies—and would
have been free had she petitioned in England. Yet she did not sue for free-
dom until she returned to the West Indies. The Admiralty Court held that,
on return to a slave jurisdiction, Grace’s slave status reattached.87
Many judges adopted this reasoning. Even moderately antislavery Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Shaw saw virtues in deference to
80. See, e.g., Wilson v. Melvin, 4 Mo. 592, 596–99 (1837) (Tompkins, J.) (holding that
staying for one month in Illinois, even though no slaves worked there, was enough to effect
freedom); Nat v. Ruddle, 3 Mo. 400 (1834) (Tompkins, J.) (finding in favor of freedom for
slave who was taken to Illinois and employed there as a slave); Milly v. Smith, 2 Mo. 36, 39
(1828) (Tompkins, J.) (holding that “slaves carried into Illinois with a view to residence, and
staying there long enough to acquire the character of residents, do by virtue of such residence
become free”).
81. 3 Mo. 270 (1833).
82. Julia, 3 Mo. at 276.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 276–77.
85. 4 Mo. 350 (1836).
86. (1827) 166 Eng. Rep. 179; 2 Hagg. Adm. 94.
87. The Slave, Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. 179; 2 Hagg. Adm. 94.
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proslavery states’ policies.88 When he freed a young slave named Med, who
had been brought into Massachusetts, Justice Shaw recognized that Massa-
chusetts had an antislavery policy, and that his state thought slavery incon-
sistent with natural justice. But he acknowledged that slavery was not
outlawed by the law of nations and, thus, that other states could support
slavery. The upshot was that Massachusetts could free a slave brought into
the Commonwealth and kept there for a period, but once a slave left Massa-
chusetts, that person could be reenslaved. That is, Massachusetts’s preference
for liberty could not outlaw slavery in another jurisdiction.89
Such reasoning appeared in Justice Story’s Conflict of Laws treatise.90
Story’s invocation of Grace to show that a person could be reenslaved once
she returned from a free state to a slave state reveals a pragmatic proslavery
attitude. It acknowledged the reality of slavery jurisprudence as well as a
judicial conservatism supporting the law of the jurisdiction where a slave
was residing when she petitioned for freedom.91 Courts increasingly invoked
Story’s Conflict of Laws to deny freedom to those seeking it.92
The evolution of decisions after Rachel v. Walker in 1836 tilted away
from freedom. This was manifest in part by the addition of proslavery judges
like William B. Napton to the Missouri Supreme Court.93 The proslavery tilt
was shifting—and dramatically so by the late 1840s—in particular by mak-
ing it harder to claim freedom based on time a petitioner (or his or her
ancestor) spent in free territory. This happened in several ways. First, Justice
Napton questioned whether the slave (or his or her ancestor) was freed
under the laws of another state. Justice Napton wrote the majority opinion
in 1841 in Rennick v. Chloe, where he found that an attempt to free a slave
via will could only effect freedom if the law of the state where the will was
written permitted such attempts to take effect.94 Because Kentucky limited
the right of an owner to free a slave via will, there was no freedom in this
88. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836).
89. Id.
90. See Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461, 471 (1843).
91. See, e.g., Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery,
and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1086 (1993) (critiquing Justice Story’s antislav-
ery reputation without addressing the proslavery implications of his Conflict of Laws).
92. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 118, 155–67 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834) (citing The Slave, Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. 179; 2 Hagg. Adm. 94,
113–14) (noting that status as slave may reattach when the slave returns to a jurisdiction where
slavery is legal); see also In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 156, 163 (1858) (citing Story, supra) (holding
that Archy should continue to be enslaved, despite the fact that he lived in California for
several years); Willard, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) at 471–72 (citing Story, supra) (holding that Julia
should be maintained in slavery despite transit through Illinois); Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5
B. Mon.) 173, 182–83 (1844) (citing Story, supra) (holding that a slave is still a slave when he
returns from a free state to Kentucky with his master); Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 583
(1852) (citing Story, supra) (“No State is bound to carry into effect enactments conceived in a
spirit hostile to that which pervades her own laws.”).
93. See Christopher Phillips, The Making of a Southerner: William Barclay
Napton’s Private Civil War 54–63 (2008) (discussing Napton’s proslavery jurisprudence).
94. 7 Mo. 197, 204–05 (1841).
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case.95 Five years later, Justice Napton voted with the majority that found
that the Northwest Ordinance did not free the mother of a petitioner. At the
time the mother was in the Northwestern territory, her area was still under
British control and, thus, the Northwest Ordinance could not have freed
her.96
In Charlotte v. Chouteau,97 the Missouri Supreme Court again dealt with
the question of whether a slave taken to Canada was freed by travel across
the international border. The court required that the slave put forward evi-
dence that slavery had been abolished in Canada—and ultimately concluded
that a government that tolerated slavery might be enough to defeat a claim
to freedom.98 In fact, the court went so far as to say that the policy of Mis-
souri was not in favor of freedom. The court emphasized that the statute
placed the burden on the slave claiming freedom and insisted that the state
should be against freedom as a general matter:
Neither sound policy nor enlightened philanthropy should encourage, in a
slaveholding State, the multiplication of a race whose condition could be
neither that of freemen nor of slaves, and whose existence and increase, in
this anomalous character, without promoting their individual comfort or
happiness, tend only to dissatisfy and corrupt those of their own race and
color remaining in a state of servitude.99
In other states, as well, courts pulled back from the doctrine that so-
journing in free states effected freedom. In 1844, the Kentucky Supreme
Court heard a claim by a slave owner whose slaves were expert musicians.
The slaves were rented out—to perform as a band—to places as far away as
New Orleans, and their owner received much of their profits. But they were
also left largely without supervision. A ship captain on the Mississippi River
hired them and took them to Cincinnati, where they promptly escaped. The
owner sued the ship captain based on a Kentucky statute that prohibited
bringing slaves to a free state, but the captain responded that the slaves were,
in fact, free. The captain claimed that the slaves had been permitted to travel
in free states and thus, relying on Lydia v. Rankin, were already free.100 The
95. Rennick, 7 Mo. at 204–05. There was a dissent by Justice Tompkins, the author of the
Winny opinion, suggesting that the trial court’s verdict freeing the slave should have been
upheld. Id. at 205.
96. See Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 1, 3 (1845).
97. 11 Mo. 193 (1847).
98. Charlotte, 11 Mo. at 199–201 (“[W]here negroes were found in a state of slavery, the
presumption would arise that the government recognized this condition as legal and war-
ranted by their laws and customs, unless some law could be shown prohibiting it.”).
99. Id. at 200–01. The Court went on to conclude that the story might be different in a
state where slavery had never existed or had been abolished, because this was something dis-
tinguishing the precedents of free states on the issue of emancipation by travel in a free state.
Id. at 201.
100. Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173, 185–86 (1844) (finding that the jury
could consider the slaves’ “habits of subordination or of independence, the liberties which had
been allowed to them, and the effect of all these circumstances, not only upon the value of
their services, but also in generating a restlessness under restraint, and a desire of freedom, and
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court rejected this argument; it found that if a slave traveled temporarily to a
free state and then voluntarily to a slave state, the slave was still a slave.101
The court did, however, find that the damages should be reduced based on
the risk that unsupervised slaves could have fled anyway. That is, the dam-
ages to the slave owner were reduced because the slaves had been allowed to
act on their own and thus travel to a free state themselves.102
III. The Counted But Not the Heard
The doctrinal evolution that made freedom suits more difficult corre-
lated with changing political values in Missouri. In 1836, in Washington,
D.C., South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun was already advancing a ro-
bust proslavery constitutional doctrine in Congress.103 This emerging prosla-
very thought in Congress had an analog in Missouri law and politics as
well.104 Missouri courts increasingly limited claims to freedom based on
travel to free territories.105 In 1845, the Missouri legislature required that
those challenging slavery post a bond, making it more difficult to bring free-
dom suits.106 Freedom suits dropped precipitously after 1845.107 Moreover, in
in affording facilities and opportunities of escape, even if they had not been taken on board
the Pike”).
101. Id. at 182 (“[A] slave returning voluntarily with his master from a free State, is still a
slave by the laws of his own country, is sustained by the opinion of eminent jurists even
among those who have maintained that by an appeal to the foreign law while within its juris-
diction, the slave may obtain the benefit of the constitutional principle with prohibits the
existence of slavery.”).
102. Id. at 186; see also Matthew Axtell, Customs of the River: Governing the Commons
within a Nineteenth-Century Steamboat Economy, 35 Law & Hist. Rev. (forthcoming 2017)
(discussing role of steamboats in the pre–Civil War economy); Matthew A. Axtell, Toward a
New Legal History of Capitalism and Unfree Labor: Law, Slavery, and Emancipation in the Amer-
ican Marketplace, 40 Law & Soc. Inquiry 270 (2015) (reviewing Walter Johnson, River of
Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (2013)) (arguing that a
pre–Civil War capitalist regime had the potential to open “subversive possibilities” for slaves).
This was partly a story of the nature of slavery along the Mississippi River. For the river
permitted fast travel and thus freedom. An editorial in St. Louis’s Daily Evening Gazette pro-
tested the employment of slaves and free people of color on river boats. Trexler, supra note
35, at 21. It spoke of the crews as “the profligate reckless band of slaves and free negroes . . .
habitually employed as stewards, firemen, and crews on our steamboats.” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Daily Evening Gazette, Aug. 18, 1841).
103. William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Contro-
versy in South Carolina, 1816–1836, at 355 (1966).
104. See, e.g., Adam Arenson, The Great Heart of the Republic: St. Louis and the
Cultural Civil War 33–41 (2011) (discussing Claiborne Fox Jackson’s resolutions and the
rift they caused in Missouri’s Democrat Party); Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Con-
tested Liberty in the Civil War Era 11–13 (2004) (discussing Missouri proslavery
politics).
105. See, e.g., Charlotte v. Chouteau, 11 Mo. 193 (1847).
106. See Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 69, § 2 (1845).
107. There were 106 freedom suits filed in the 1830s. There were 68 in the first five years
of the 1840s (1840–1844) and there were only 21 from 1845 to 1849. See St. Louis Circuit
Court Historical Records Project, supra note 33.
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1849, the Missouri legislature expressed its proslavery sentiments when the
Jackson Resolutions passed overwhelmingly. The Resolutions supported
slavery in the territories, severely weakening the position that slaves should
be free by virtue of travel to the territories.108
It was in this world that the claim of Dred Scott and his wife arrived
before the Missouri Supreme Court in 1852. Scott’s claim was based on time
that the Scotts spent in free territory (in what is now Minnesota) when their
owner was stationed there with the U.S. Army. Even though the Rachel opin-
ion maintained that time spent in a free territory entitled the slave to free-
dom, the result in Scott’s case—a ruling that maintained them in slavery—
should not have been surprising. Scott v. Emerson produced a result quite
directly opposite that of Rachel.
The proslavery rhetoric, which had appeared in public debate and in
earlier cases, appeared in the Emerson opinion and counsel’s arguments.109
The court concluded with a statement about the virtues of slavery for the
enslaved.110 Where abolitionists were talking about the brutality of slavery
and depicting enslaved people as citizens-in-waiting, by the 1850s, prosla-
very writers countered with pictures of the virtues of slavery.111 The court
joined the chorus with this statement:
There is no comparison between the slave in the United States and the
cruel, uncivilized negro in Africa. When the condition of our slaves is con-
trasted with the state of their miserable race in Africa; when their civiliza-
tion, intelligence and instruction in religious truths are considered, and the
means now employed to restore them to the country from which they have
been torn, bearing with them the blessings of civilized life, we are almost
persuaded, that the introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the provi-
dence of God, who makes the evil passions of men subservient to His own
glory, a means of placing that unhappy race within the pale of civilized
nations.112
Looking back from the vantage of Emerson, we can see several key doc-
trinal developments beginning in the late 1820s that undid the claim for
108. See J. Res., 15th Gen. Assemb., 1849 Mo. Laws 667; see also Cong. Globe, 31st Cong.,
1st Sess. 97–98 (1850) (printing the Jackson Resolutions); Trexler, supra note 35, at 153–55
(discussing the Jackson Resolutions). One of the key points of the Resolutions is that the
United States territories should not prohibit slavery. See Mo. J. Res., supra. Thus, the Resolu-
tions directly conflicted with petitioners who challenged slavery based on time spent in a
“free” territory, for they suggested that there were no territories where slavery did not exist. It
is unsurprising, then, that the Missouri Supreme Court changed direction in Scott v. Emerson,
15 Mo. 576 (1852).
109. Counsel told a story of the origins of the Missouri Compromise—which prohibited
slavery from the territories north of Missouri’s southern border—as a response to antislavery
activity that “threatened the existence of the Union and the perpetuity of free institutions.”
Emerson, 15 Mo. at 580.
110. See infra note 112.
111. See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 58, at 227–43 (describing leading proslavery writer
Thomas Cobb’s discussion of the supposed virtues of slavery); Roth, supra note 30, at 74–104,
247–83 (describing abolitionists’ depictions of enslaved people as citizens in waiting).
112. Emerson, 15 Mo. at 587.
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freedom. First, there was the question of whether temporary sojourn to a
free state was sufficient to free a slave.113 Second, there was the question of
whether a jurisdiction was really antislavery.114 This appeared first with
sojourns to Canada and was later expanded to U.S. territory.115 Third, there
was the conclusion that slavery reattached upon return to Missouri.116 And
finally, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, there
was the decision that that the enslaved could not even be permitted to ap-
pear in court.117 The Taney Court thus attempted to make a fact out of the
widespread belief among proslavery advocates that African Americans were
inferior. The Supreme Court tried to use law to silence the enslaved as it
legitimized the idea that the Constitution supported slavery in the territo-
ries.118 This was followed in numerous cases from Mississippi119 to Califor-
nia120 in the brief period between the Dred Scott decision in March 1857 and
the beginning of Civil War in April 1861.
VanderVelde’s story is about how the humble enslaved people sought to
turn the courts to their advantage. But there is a question whether their
advocacy changed the outcome. Perhaps outcomes changed when the hum-
ble appealed to the powerful and the powerful reached down to help them—
such as happens in paternalism.121 Some of this may be that the petitioners
held the legal system to its own procedure. That is one explanation for the
civil rights movement’s success in the years leading into Brown.122 Some of it
113. See supra text accompanying notes 75–108.
114. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 90–96.
117. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
Const. amend. XIV.
118. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452.
119. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859). In Mitchell, the court refused to allow
an African American heir to receive property left to her by her father, a Mississippi resident.
Id. at 264. She had been freed in Ohio, which the court found inconsistent with Mississippi’s
policy of slavery. Id.
120. See, e.g., In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 150 (1858) (finding that the Constitution provided
support for slavery in the territory of California). Archy, a slave brought from Mississippi to
the free territory of California by his owner for a temporary sojourn, was returned to slavery.
Id. at 147–48. In Archy, the court used the idea that slavery was a national institution to
maintain a person in slavery who might have been freed some decades earlier. See id. at 150.
121. See generally Erskine Clarke, Dwelling Place: A Plantation Epic (2005) (dis-
cussing paternalism on the plantations); Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The
World the Slaves Made (Vintage Books 1976) (1972) (discussing slaves’ acceptance of pa-
ternalism as a way for them to implicitly reject slavery).
122. The civil rights movement presents a successful story of legal change, where local
members of the African American community were agents of change. See, e.g., Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the Civil
Rights Movement 441 (2011) (crediting lawyers with helping activists become agents of
change); Kenneth W. Mack, Representing the Race: The Creation of the Civil Rights
Lawyer 64 (2012) (interpreting courtrooms as public spaces where African American lawyers
“crossed racial lines” and where they could “disrupt the social interactions that helped define
race”).
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may be that judges were predisposed to freedom in limited cases.123 The lines
of causation await more speculation and inquiry into the biographies of in-
dividual jurists, the arguments of counsel, and the legal, political, and social
culture of the courts.124
But the central tendency is in another direction—and it shows the
power of legal tradition and the power of vested rights. In 1823, Chief Justice
Marshall recognized in The Antelope125 that the power of property rights in
humans was great, and that it was not constrained by questions of morality.
As the calls for freedom grew louder, the reaction of the legislatures and
courts went in the other direction.126 Missouri politics were increasingly pro-
slavery.127 Judges, too, were increasingly proslavery.128 The shift against free-
dom came as a result of the shift in the judges who were on the bench.129
What is not fully apparent from VanderVelde’s narrative is how the shift in
the judiciary correlated with the shift towards increasingly proslavery ideas
in Missouri and Southern politics. That is, as the enslaved people were
clamoring for justice, the courts were refusing to listen. They could not—in
fact, would not—hear the claims for justice. Or, in Ralph Ellison’s apt
phrasing about African Americans during the Jim Crow era, they were
“among the counted but not among the heard.”130 Dred Scott, then, repre-
sented the final version of the proslavery vision that there was no law to
protect the enslaved.131
The results link legal ideas to the shifting political character. The legal
doctrine followed the increasing sense that slaves had no political identity,
for it said they could not appear in court.132 This doctrine was part of the
attempt to make a legal reality out of the belief that enslaved people should
not be heard or allowed to speak. Thus, Dred Scott is the dependent variable
that follows the Southerners’ ideas that slaves did not deserve the rights to
challenge slavery. This rationale goes back to the ideology articulated in
123. See Dennis K. Boman, The Dred Scott Case Reconsidered: The Legal and Political Con-
text in Missouri, 44 Am. J. Legal His. 405, 407–09 (2000).
124. Id. at 422–23 (discussing Scott, Ryland, and dissenting Justice Gamble’s elections to
the Missouri Supreme Court); see also Dennis K. Boman, Abiel Leonard: Yankee Slave-
holder, Eminent Jurist, and Passionate Unionist 145–58 (2002) (discussing proslavery
opinions in Missouri politics).
125. 23 U.S. 66 (1825); see also Jonathan M. Bryant, Dark Places of the Earth: The
Voyage of the Slave Ship Antelope xvii–xx, 229–39, 294 (2015).
126. Boman, supra note 123, at 408–14.
127. Id. at 414–17.
128. Id. at 417.
129. Id.
130. Ralph Ellison, Three Days Before the Shooting . . . 1004 (John F. Callahan &
Adam Bradley eds., 2010).
131. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 267 (1829) (releasing a slave’s hirer
from liability for shooting her because the obedience required of slaves requires “uncontrolled
authority over the body” of the slave).
132. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452–54 (1857), superseded by consti-
tutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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North Carolina in 1830 in State v. Mann. In that case, which overturned the
conviction of a man for abusing a slave in his custody, the judge wrote about
the need for an owner’s “uncontrolled authority over the body” of the
slave.133 Mann correlates with another shift in the law of slavery: states in-
creasingly prohibited owners from using their wills to offer slaves freedom.
Where owners sometimes offered freedom via will to their slaves if the slaves
agreed to leave the state, some states turned against this practice because the
they recognized that it would give slaves too much autonomy.134 In every
way they could, courts were attempting to create a legal reality out of the
lack of rights and choices.135 And the series of decisions surveyed above
shows that courts were developing proslavery ideas decades before Dred
Scott.
Conclusion
Lea VanderVelde’s brilliant book reminds us that people who were com-
pletely forgotten still tried to claim their freedom. That the claims were not
always successful—in fact, that they met with increasing opposition—does
not diminish their significance as gauges of the pleas for freedom. Redemp-
tion Songs, thus, is an important piece of the intellectual history of protest
movements.
Yet, as it recovers the claims made by the humble, Redemption Songs
invites questions about how legal change occurs. Law was, occasionally, a
technology that facilitated claims to freedom. More often, however, it was a
technology that facilitated control. These cases suggest how little could be
done through the legal system. They suggest that there was a demand for
justice that needs to be studied. But those demands for justice were indepen-
dent of what was happening in the courts. A close inspection of the central
133. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267.
134. See Bailey v. Poindexter’s Ex’r, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858) (denying slaves the legal
capacity to choose between freedom and slavery); see also Jamison v. Bridge, 14 La. Ann. 31
(1859) (prohibiting a slave from suing on a will offering him freedom).
135. Dred Scott was based on a deep well of cultural attitudes toward racial hierarchy and
white supremacy in Missouri, which appeared in both the legislature and the courts in the
1840s and 1850s. One example of this is the treatise on slavery written by Hugh A. Garland,
one of the lawyers who represented Dred Scott’s owner. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred
Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 256 (1978). Garland’s treatise
remained uncompleted at this death in 1854 and was never published. It drew heavily upon
the pseudoscientific ethnographic proslavery literature, such as Josiah C. Nott and George R.
Gliddon’s Types of Mankind (6th ed., Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1854). See
Hugh A. Garland, Amalgamation, in 2 Treatise on Slavery 32–40 (1854) (unpublished
manuscript in the Garland Family Papers, Library of Virginia) (on file with Michigan Law
Review). Garland grimly and succinctly stated his vision of white supremacy:
Here we have a race of people with feeble domestic and social affections, small intellect,
large animal propensities, and a general cranial development largely below the standard
of civilized man. This is the untameable [sic] savage that civilization cannot reform and
cannot subdue; he must then recede before it. This is the inevitable course of Providence.
Id. at 35.
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tendency of the American law of slavery reveals just how limited the oppor-
tunities were to challenge it. Such a study causes us to ask again, in the
words of a delegate to the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829 and
1830, “[w]hen were men in power ever ready for reform?”136
136. Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–30, at
427 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830) (quoting Philip Doddridge).
